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Abstract
Chairperson: Jeffrey Bookwalter
Gender empowerment is an oft-cited result of microfinance participation. However,
research to verify this outcome continues to produce ambivalent results implying that
microfinance programs are not maximizing their potential impact. While gender
empowerment may be a desirable end to development, it is less often used as a means
to achieve development goals. This paper tests the hypothesis that gender
empowerment improves microfinance program performance using data from the
Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) and a theoretical framework based
on prevalent institutional ideologies. The results show that empowered clients have a
higher likelihood of attaining desirable program outcomes. These results can be taken as
evidence that microfinance organizations should consider investments in support
programs to directly address social impediments to gender empowerment as a way to
increase their overall effectiveness.
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CHAPTER 1: THE EMPOWERMENT MYTH
Microfinance programs in Bangladesh have been celebrated in the development
community for almost two decades. The programs, operated by internationally
renowned non-governmental organizations like the Nobel Prize winning Grameen Bank,
provide small loans to borrowers who have traditionally been excluded from the formal
banking sector. This bottom-up approach to poverty alleviation disciplined by market
forces appeals to a broad range of ideologies. In addition, the focus on female
borrowers has promoted the idea that microfinance is a tool for gender empowerment.
In reality there is scarcely explored terrain between microfinance and gender
empowerment. What lies between the two is an assumption that increasing female
income-generation translates into elevated status within households and communities.
In their book, The Economics of Microfinance, Beatriz Armendariz de Aghion and
Jonathan Morduch describe the gender empowerment record as a myth which is
increasingly taken for granted as fact (de Aghion and Morduch 2005). As microfinance
programs expand and multiply around the world, gender empowerment is an
assumption merits closer examination.
In Bangladesh, it is believed that targeting women for microfinance participation
makes sense for a number of reasons (de Aghion and Morduch 2005). First, women are
better household stewards; they use their income to increase family nutrition and
educate their children. Second, they are more responsible clients; loans dispersed to
women have higher repayment rates than loans dispersed to men. Finally, microfinance
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institutions claim that providing women with access to credit increases their capabilities
and options; participation by definition is empowering.
However, none of these rationales maintain their superficial virtue after a
critique. Women are better household stewards than men because they are
economically, socially, and physically confined to the household. High repayment rates
among women are often attributed to advent of group lending. A women’s primary duty
outside of the home is to maintain a family’s honor and status in the community. In this
context, group lending can be a mechanism of group support, but it can also be
powerfully coercive. Accounts of public torment and suicide of defaulting female
borrowers are not uncommon (Cheston and Fraioli, 2002).
Finally, the claim that the act of participation in microfinance programs is itself
empowering produces contradictory evidence. Empowerment is a complex interaction
of factors, economic being just one. It is unclear if access to credit has any impact on
the enormous social empowerment constraints that also limit women’s choices. The
chance that these social constraints are affected diminishes when one stops assuming
that loans dispersed to women are always and necessarily used or controlled by those
women. Naila Kabeer (Kabeer 2001) found that on average only 40% of women who
received loans were the primary decision-maker in how the loan was used.1 More often
than not, a woman’s participation is limited to that of a financial intermediary between
the microfinance institutions and male relatives. Some researchers have alleged that

1

In the data used for this paper I found that only 38% of female borrowers have any say (sole or joint
control) in how loans are utilized (NWMF Data, 2007).
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under these circumstances microfinance is actually disempowering. Women who act as
intermediaries are held accountable for loans even if they lack control over them. Some
studies have shown increased domestic violence, polygamy, and even decreased female
consumption associated with microfinance participation.
It remains inconclusive whether or not microfinance is empowering, and it is also
unknown how or to what extent empowerment contributes to the success of a
microfinance program. Some authors have hypothesized a positive feedback loop
between client empowerment and the performance of microfinance programs. In what
she calls virtuous spirals, Linda Mayoux (2005) describes microfinance programs as both
benefiting from and contributing to gender empowerment. It is important to better
understand this two-way relationship because, while few in Bangladesh openly dispute
the value of gender equality and empowerment, the fact that progress through
microfinance has been ambivalent implies that the issue still lacks the focus it deserves.
In other contexts, particularly management studies, the contribution of
empowerment in attaining organizational goals has been studied at length. Such
research in the microfinance sector may shift organizational and donor attitudes in favor
of support programs and strategies to directly enhance the gender empowerment of
their clients as a means to achieve the larger goals of microfinance.
This paper will explore the contributions that client empowerment has on the
success of microfinance programs. However, before the issue can be handled other
questions need to be addressed, namely “what is empowerment?” and “how is success
defined by microfinance organizations?”
3

As a catch-phrase, empowerment has been around for several decades. Rather
than codifying a single definition, empowerment advocates have emerged from every
theoretical persuasion and capitalized on its intangible quality. In short, empowerment
is broadly used to describe a range of desirable outcomes and assumes different
meanings depending on who is using it. In development, its most devout promoters can
be divided in to two very different and often conflicting groups, the new neo-liberals
and the promoters of well-being centered development. New neo-liberals see
empowerment as a valuable input for capital accumulation and economic growth. This
interpretation has been adopted by many international institutions in response to
criticisms of structural reform policies. Such reforms were widely condemned for
producing growth and increasing market stability at the expense of the poor. By
incorporating empowerment into their programs, some institutions hope to assume a
“pro-poor” approach to growth and development.
Many of those who criticized structural reform did so while advocating a more
holistic approach to development. These critics view individual and community wellbeing as the ultimate focus of development—health, education, and improved living
standards and capabilities. In this mode of thinking, empowerment is a chief desirable
outcome which creates positive feedback for all other well-being measurements.2 In
short, from the well-being perspective empowerment is development.
These ideological standpoints, new neoliberal and well-being, account for
differences in defining success and goals of microfinance programs. Based on the
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An outcome which contributes to virtuous spirals (Mayoux 2006).
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perpetuated notion that development can be equated with economic growth, new neoliberals support a best practices approach to microfinance. The goal of institutions that
reflect this view is to create financially sustainable programs that link clients to
traditional banking and financial services. Microfinance programs that are driven by the
well-being approach exist to improve the quality of life of their participants. The goals
these programs may emphasize include improving living standards and helping the poor
develop the skills and abilities to effectively represent and attain their needs.

Gender Disempowerment in Bangladesh
It should be noted that most microfinance programs reflect a combination of
these two perspectives and that the expectations of donors are an important factor in
shaping a program’s publically espoused goals and mission.
The underlying idea that has promoted the importance of empowerment is that
groups and individuals should have equal opportunities to compete and participate in an
aspiring capitalistic/democratic society. Mainstream development embraces these
economic and political systems and policies and programs attempt to create favorable
conditions for liberal institutions. Most contemporary Western thought would not
believe that it is possible for an illiberal society to prosper—rights and freedom are
essential to functioning democratic and capitalistic institutions.
From this prospective, gender empowerment in Bangladesh would help reshape
a paralytic illiberal society into one that is more capable of development. A second,
more pragmatic (and less politically thorny) rationale for empowerment is that the
productivity of microfinance programs are constrained proportionally to the extent that
5

women are disempowered. While millions are being spent in microfinance programs,
the poverty alleviation possibilities are far from being realized because female bowers
are limited by discrimination.
In Bangladesh, women are traditionally subordinate to men. The country has a
patriarchal, patrilineal, and patrilocal social system that governs women’s economic
activity, mobility, and responsibilities (Pal 2001, 4). Male children are valued as potential
providers and perpetrators of family names and daughters are seen as temporary
members in their households. Thus, resource allocations favor sons while women are
viewed in a reproductive capacity and as dependants.
Social and cultural conditions in Bangladesh result in enormous economic
disparities for women. This disparity is readily apparent in the labor market where
women are concentrated in a few sectors: agriculture, manufacturing, and selfemployment. Agriculture primarily takes place at home in the form of small animal
rearing and tending fruit trees and gardens. During harvest and planting poor rural
women may also work as day laborers. The garment industry is the largest part
Bangladesh’s manufacturing sector. It drives most of the country’s economic growth and
primarily employs young women in urban areas. Manufacturing also includes
handicrafts, another large employer of women. Self-employed women are primarily
domestic service workers.
All of these sectors have one thing in common: they are low skill and offer
equally low wages. Domestic servants and day laborers are often paid with subsistence
food rations (Labour Market &Trade Union Fact Sheet 2006). Small scale animal rearing
6

and handicrafts are traditional areas of female employment which are highly
competitive and offer very small profit margins. The garment industry attracts
thousands of girls and young women to urban areas every year. This gives them a
measure of independence, but with very little compensation. The minimum wage in the
garment industry is currently set by the Bangladesh Wage Board at 1662.5 BDT a month,
about 332 USD annually (Yan 2008)3. Almost no women work in sectors that offer
reasonable wages and a way out of poverty.
The cultural and religious norms of purdah, physical female seclusion, limit
women’s engagement in the public sphere in various ways throughout the country.4 The
observance of purdah imposes restrictions on dress, mobility, and interactions with men
outside of one’s household. This makes it difficult or impossible for a woman to safely
act in the market place which, consequently, severely limits economic opportunities for
women. Women who fail proper observance of purdah, risk lowering the social status of
their households and can be subjected to public assault and harassment. Researchers
have noted that increasing wealth and status can create a perverse incentive by
enabling poor women to increase their observance of purdah as their income allows
them to do so. Naila Kabeer notes that purdah is often simultaneously expressive of
class hierarchy and social standing but that the relationship is not entirely
straightforward due to complex highly localized traditions which determine what
constitutes acceptable and unacceptable behaviors for women (Kabeer 2001, 69).

3

For more information on minimum wage negotiations in Bangladesh see www.cleanclothes.org
and www.labourbehindthelabel.org.
4
Common in Muslim and Hindu households.
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Women in Bangladesh are poor and it is not because they lack access to credit.
Women are poor and will continue to be poor until they have equal access to markets
and economic opportunities. Women do not have equal access because of the pervasive
gender attitudes that restrict their opportunities and choices. Simply providing clients
with credit without simultaneously expanding their opportunity to make productive use
of their financial capital is not an empowering poverty eradication strategy, which is
evident in the ambivalent outcomes microfinance has for empowering female clients.
In summary, a simple syllogism can demonstrate that microfinance programs in
Bangladesh are not using their resources optimally:
•
•
•
•

Most microfinance programs in Bangladesh are market-based
solutions that target women.
Markets do not work optimally when choices are limited.
Women acting in markets in Bangladesh face severely limited
choices.
Therefore, most microfinance is not operating optimally.

Hypothesis
I hypothesize that regardless of ideological persuasions, gender empowerment
improves microfinance performance. Microfinance programs are not operating
optimally unless women are being empowered to participate directly in markets. To
improve the returns of microfinance programs, organizations should prioritize
empowerment and actively strive to improve their female clients’ social standing while
simultaneously expanding and encouraging their economic activity. This is verifiable
through deductive reasoning, supported by the theoretical work of numerous scholars,
and verifiable through qualitative observation and empirical research.
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This paper will start by describing the framework I use to test this hypothesis. I
will discuss the two prevailing ideologies in development and describe how they shape
our understanding of empowerment. This discussion will conclude with a description of
gender empowerment as it is commonly applied in Bangladesh’s microfinance
programs.
I will then survey the previous literature on empowerment in microfinance. The
framework that was used to describe different conceptions of development and
empowerment will be extended to analyze the often conflicting goals of microfinance.
Finally, I will use the framework to test the conclusion from the two prevailing
ideological standpoints. To do this I used data from the Bangladesh Rural Advancement
Committee’s (BRAC) Northwest Microfinance Expansion Project (NWMF). The NWMF
data tracked participants from 2002 to 2006 in seven of the poorest and most
underserved districts (zila) of Bangladesh: Ponchagar, Thakurgaon, Dinajpur, Nilphamari,
Lalmonirhat, Rangpur and Gaibandha.
With this data, it is possible to determine what impact empowerment, or
disempowerment, has on program performance from either of the prevailing ideological
standpoints. The results show that empowerment should be widely recognized as both
an important end and means to development, that confronting traditional gender
norms could increase development returns, and that programs, regardless of ideological
bias, would benefit from higher levels of gender empowerment.

9

CHAPTER 2: FRAMEWORK
The Two Faces of Empowerment
As discussed in the introduction, the idea that Bangladeshi microfinance
programs empower their female participants is a presumption based on conflicting
evidence and unproven theory. The literature on empowerment, while abundant, fails
to generate a consistent definition or indicators. These definitions and usages can be
divided into two broad ideological categories, new neoliberal and well-being, ideologies
that also reflect two fundamentally different concepts of development.
Empowerment is an interdisciplinary concept with roots in psychology and
political science where theories of power and power relations are examined from the
individual to the macro levels. The term was popularized in contemporary vocabulary
through management practices of the 1980s and 1990s (Wilkinson 1998). In the 1970s,
so called “industrial democracy” emphasized workers’ rights to participate in traditional
management decisions as a means of making the workplace more meaningful, and thus
increasing worker productivity. The political and ideological shifts in the 1980s in
America and Europe popularized aspects of this management philosophy and gave birth
to the existing understanding of empowerment. Individuals within an organization were
to be seen as entrepreneurs unhindered by bureaucracy and free to unleash their
talents. Management buzzwords of the time such as “productivity through people” and
“autonomy and entrepreneurship,” would fit comfortably in the promotional jargon of
most microfinance enterprises (Peters and Waterman 1982).
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Prior to the popularization of “empowerment,” economic development policy
was dominated by a theoretical school that emphasized liberalized trade and stable
macroeconomic growth. Out of appreciation for the attempt to fit developing
economies into classical liberal paradigms, these theories are referred to as neoliberal
and are credited with producing structural reform policies, also known, more
pejoratively, as the Washington Consensus. The Washington Consensus is a phrase
coined by John Williamson to “refer to the lowest common denominator of policy
advice being addressed by the Washington-based institutions to Latin American
countries” (Williamson 2000, 251). This denominator consisted of ten parts: 1) Fiscal
discipline; 2) Changing public expenditure; 3) Tax reform; 4) Interest rate liberalization;
5) Instituting a competitive exchange rate; 6) Trade liberalization; 7) Lower barriers to
foreign direct investment; 8) Privatization; 9) Deregulation; and 10) Property rights.
Structural reform equated development with macroeconomic growth, and
prescribed policies that were believed to have transformed the European and American
economies over the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Its opponents, however, saw
that policies often lacked important components, could generate a host of disastrous
side effects, and many did not agree that stable growth should be at the heart of
development.
Among the issues the Washington Consensus neglected were financial
regulation, the facilitation of technology transfer, and efforts to encourage and improve
transparency (Stiglitz 1998). Emphasizing market liberalization often left governments
with insufficient tools to address serious market failures. Joseph Stiglitz argues that rigid
11

adherence to free-market dogma is in part to blame for the Asian economic crisis of the
late 1990s (Stiglitz 1998).
Many of the countries that subscribed to structural reform did not attain the
expected outcomes—some even fared worse. The Washington Consensus’
preoccupation with lowering inflation constrained growth and employment in some
countries. The Consensus also promoted free trade which was as controversial in the
developing world as it has become in developed nations. Free trade policies can lead to
a loss of jobs and decreasing benefits and compensation as firms struggle to compete,
and rising prices as governments eliminate subsidies. All of these effects
disproportionately affect the poor. The most damning evidence against the Washington
Consensus is that in its heyday, poor countries became relatively poorer. Between 1960
and 1990, the ratio of GDP per capita of the highest to lowest income countries widened
from 38.5 to 45.2 (Pritchett 1997, 11). It appeared to many onlookers that World Bank
and International Monetary Fund policy had failed to stimulate development.
Finally, many prominent critics of the Washington Consensus disagreed about
the goal of development that structural reform works toward. Joseph Stiglitz, who
served as the Senior World Bank Vice President from 1997 to 1998, called to “broaden
the objectives of development to include… sustainable development, egalitarian
development, and democratic development” (Stiglitz 1998, 1). Others had been calling
for an even more drastic shift in thinking for years. 1998 Nobel laureate Amartya Sen,
argued that rather than being conducive to development, “substantive freedoms (that
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is, the liberty of political participation or the opportunity to receive basic education or
health care) are among the constituent components of development” (Sen 1999, 5).
With rising unpopularity of the Washington Consensus and structural reform
policies the World Bank and IMF looked for new ways to improve their programs and
their image. This lead to what Dani Rodrik dubbed the “augmented Washington
Consensus” (Rodrik 2001, 16), which includes:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Corporate governance
Anti-corruption
Flexible labor markets
World Trade Organization agreements
Financial codes and standards
“Prudent” capital-account opening
Non-intermediate exchange rate regimes
Independent central banks/inflation targeting
Social safety nets
Targeted poverty reduction

I would argue that empowerment should be added to this list. The World Bank’s
2000/2001 World Development Report officially works it into a poverty reducing
framework by suggesting that the 1980s was a time that focused on economic
management and building reliance on market forces. This was followed by the 1990s
when governance and institutions became the logical focus of reform. Now, the report
states that the next ten year plan is to build on the previous two decades of progress
and proposes a “strategy for attacking poverty in three ways: promoting opportunity,
facilitating empowerment, and enhancing security” (World Bank 2000/2001, 6). The
Report states that political empowerment of the poor is one way to strengthen the
institutional environment of democratic regimes and make them more effective at
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reducing poverty (World Bank 2000/2001, 114), but the only definition of
empowerment that is suggested by the document is that it is something that makes
state and social institutions more responsive to the poor (World Bank 2000/2001, 3).
The chronological framework described in the 2000/2001 report evolved further
under the scholarship of Lord Nicholas Stern, the Bank’s Chief Economist and Senior
Vice President from 2000 to 2003. In a series of lectures he describes two pillars in a
development strategy: creating an investment climate and advancing empowerment
(Stern, Dethier and Rogers 2005, 129). This approach, described in the tellingly titled
book Growth and Empowerment (Stern, Dethier and Rogers 2005), views empowerment
as a previously unobserved pillar that, along with macroeconomic reform, lifts up the
pediment of development by helping support a positive investment environment. This
framework appears to be in keeping with the ideas of Stern’s predecessor, Joseph
Stiglitz, but does not endorse redefining development as Amartya Sen suggests. This
framework and Stern’s coined definition of empowerment, a process of increasing the
capacity of individuals or groups to make choices and to transform those choices into
desired actions and outcomes, has become deeply integrated into the World Bank’s
operations.5
The competing perspective on empowerment is championed by Amartya Sen
and others who seek to redefine the process and goals of development. In response to
the dominant perspective which still concentrates on creating stability and growth, the

5

For World Bank case studies on empowerment see
http://povlibrary.worldbank.org/library/topic/10143/13942/.
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alternative theory seeks to redefine development as a process that creates the things
that lead to a good life — health, education, and freedoms. Sen does not deny the
importance of economic stability and income (Anand and Sen 2000, Sen, “A Decade of
Human Development” 2000), but does seek to move away from them as a primary
objective.
This approach, though widely appealing, is more difficult to quantify and monitor
than that of the new neoliberals, which may explain why it has not been fully embraced
by international institutions in an era of accountability and transparency. Proponents of
empowerment on the well-being side tend to favor this conception for the same reason.
Amartya Sen himself, when writing on the Human Development Index, claimed that the
“lack of a general theory allows for an openness that is important for this kind of work”
(Sen, A Decade of Human Development 2000, 22). While it is difficult to precisely define
empowerment from this perspective it is clear that the well-being approach is
characterized by its role in the development framework: to new neoliberals it is a tool to
support development, but to well-being proponents it is development and the things
that empower—health, education, and income—are the supports.
Today there exist two fundamentally different and often competing ideas of
what development is, yet both sides embrace “empowerment.” The World Bank invests
millions of dollars in empowerment programs, from establishing farmers’ collectives in
Sub-Saharan Africa to incorporating technology into everyday lives in rural Japan. In this
new neoliberal framework empowerment is a vital input that when added to the
existing formula produces the consistent desired output, stable growth. For proponents
15

of well-being, empowerment is both an important input and the desired output. These
same ideological groups nicely parallel two perspectives on microfinance, which will be
discussed at greater length in the next section.

Competing Perspectives on the Purpose of Microfinance
Empowerment is an oft-cited product of microfinance. The advent of these
programs coincided with the rise of Amartya Sen’s theories and the rethinking of the
Washington Consensus, so it is not surprising that microfinance was initially acclaimed
as a mechanism for empowerment. What is surprising is that the relationship is still so
widely assumed to exist when there is still so little evidence for it.
The primary body of literature on empowerment and microfinance begins in the
early 1990s. In 1994, Anne Marie Goetz and Rina Sen Gupta (Goetz and Gupta 1994)
used a five point index of managerial control as an indicator of empowerment. They
found that the majority of women, particularly married women, exercised little or no
control over their loans, which suggests three scenarios for repayment— all of which
have negative implications for women. First, male family members who use the loan
might take responsibility for repayment, which, although not a negative outcome for the
female borrowers, negates the objective of lending to women. Second, men may be
unable to contribute to repayments and the female borrowers have to substitute funds
from their own sources—they have all the responsibility without any of the control.
Finally, there are men who are unwilling to repay the loans. This leads to increased
tension within the household and contributes to an increase in violence (Vonderlack and
Schreiner 2002). The authors recommended developing programs and strategies to give
16

female borrowers access (Vonderlack and Schreiner 2002) to markets as a way to
support borrowers and build gender empowerment. In 1996, Gotez and Gotez and
Gupta found that lost bargaining power may force female borrowers to surrender a
fraction of their loans to their husbands in exchange for his services as her informal
contract enforcer (Gotez and Gupta, 1996). Ackerly (1995) uses accounting knowledge
as an indicator that other transformative outcomes are occurring. She found that where
women did not have control of their loans and were ill-aware of their rights, they did
not demonstrate increased empowerment as a result of microfinance participation. She
also found that access to markets is the most important determinant of empowerment.
She warned that the likelihood of overwork, fatigue, and malnutrition would increase
where loans were used to promote women’s labor involvement without also promoting
market access. Finally, among the early myth detractors, Montgomery, Bhattacharya,
and Hulme (1996) found that only 9% of first-time female borrowers were the primary
users of their loans and that access to loans did little to change management within the
household for either female or male borrowers. They found that loans had done little to
empower women; they succeeded in increasing the social status of the loan-receiving
women compared to less well-off women, but did nothing to elevate their status in their
household or the wider community vis-à-vis men.
In the 1990s microfinance programs still left the vast majority of the so-called
“ultra poor” underserved (Matin 2005). As a result, these early studies concentrated on
the relatively affluent moderate poor. Product diversification and better targeting
means that more and more of the most impoverished Bangladeshis are now served by
17

microfinance programs. However, the changing demographics of the target population
have had no impact on researchers who would question the empowerment assumption.
Naila Kabeer finds that patriarchal practices put women at a comparative disadvantage
for accessing certain lucrative markets. This causes them to face tradeoffs, which leads
them to make decisions that are arguably disempowering, such as clustering in lowproductivity activities and/or relying on male family members as contract enforcers
(Kabeer 2001). While access to credit succeeded in increasing the rate at which women
participated in economic activities, it failed to increase the range of economic activities
to which they have access. The vast gender disparities in market access and earning
potential are confirmed by Sukti Dasgupta and Smita Barbattini who find that selfemployed Bangladeshi men earn more than three times the income earned by selfemployed women and small scale male entrepreneurs earn about four times more than
their female counterparts (Dasgupta and Barbattini 2003).
At the same time, there are those who find evidence that supports the idea that
microfinance empowers women. In 1986, Rushidan Rahman did an impact evaluation
for Grameen Bank. He found that “active” female borrowers (women who personally
utilize the loans) were more likely to have a role in household decision making than
“passive” female borrowers (those who act as intermediaries for male relatives).
However, both active and passive female borrowers had higher rates of consumption
and were more likely to participate in household decision making than women in
households that were not participating in microfinance (Rahman 1986). Hashemi,
Schuler, and Riley explored the impact of credit on a number of indicators of
18

empowerment, including women’s economic contribution, female mobility, control over
purchasing decisions, asset control, and political and legal awareness. They found that
access to credit was significant in increasing the likelihood of greater asset control,
purchasing decisions, and political and legal awareness. They also found that access to
credit was associated with reduced levels of violence against women (Schuler, Hashemi
and Riley 1997). More recently, it has been demonstrated that female microfinance
participation reduces fertility and has a positive impact on child health (Pitt, Khandker,
and Cartwright , 1999; Pitt, Khandker, Choudhury, and Millimet 2003).6
While the possibility exists that microfinance can be a vehicle for female
empowerment, the studies that make positive findings do not address concerns raised
by detractors in such a way that erases all doubt. Schuler, Hashemi, and Riley (1996)
come closest to exploring a comprehensive definition of empowerment, but their study
precedes the extensive outreach to the ultra poor and omits income and status
differentials between rural microfinance clients and their non-participating neighbors as
a possible explanatory variable. Serious doubts regarding the empowerment claim have
yet to be satisfied so it cannot be determined what impact microfinance really has. That
said, even the most skeptical observers do not claim that microfinance programs lack
the potential to be major vehicles for improving the status of their female clients.
Fulfilling this potential largely depends on espoused values and goals of microfinance
programs.

6

While Pitt, Khandker and Cartwright initially suggested that this was a sign of empowerment, in 2006 Pitt
et al. conceded that choosing to care for a sick child was not necessarily an implication that women have
gained power in the household (Pitt, Khandker and Cartwright 2006).
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As I suggested earlier, the founding ideologies of empowerment neatly
correspond with two different perspectives on the goals of microfinance programs.
These are the best practices perspective and the well-being perspective. They impact
what goals a program aspires to and how they are managed.
In 1995 a group of donor agencies lead by the World Bank launched the
Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) to improve the quality of microfinance
programming. This quickly became a push to move donors and programs toward
identified best practice performance standards. CGAP is currently housed in the World
Bank, and the best practices perspective of microfinance parallels that institution’s
characteristic approach to development by emphasizing the need for self-sufficient and
financially sustainable microfinance programs. The best practices perspective does not
believe that microfinance institutions should be comprehensive development
organizations or “social protection systems and safety net programs” (Consultative
Group to Assist the Poor 2006, 10). Rather, they provide the poor who need it with
access to a wide range of quality financial services that are integrated into the overall
national or international financial systems. The best practices approach attempts to
build microfinance institutions in the same model as traditional financial institutions,
market oriented and weaned from donors, which suggests that they are not appropriate
everywhere for everyone.
The best practice framework is a three tiered “inclusive” system. At the microlevel are retail financial institutions characterized by good governance, optimal interest
rates, incentivized employees, and diverse products that reward the most loyal and
20

responsible clients. The ideal clients for micro-level retailers can be characterized as
successful if she or he makes payments on time, steadily increases his or her
involvement with the MFI, and purchases multiple products. The meso-level enables
micro-level retailers by facilitating linkages with mainstream institutions with networks
and associations, auditors, rating agencies, credit bureaus, and information technology
providers. Finally, on the macro-level the best practice vision relies on a stable
macroeconomic policy environment that supports “interest rate liberalization, inflation
control and prudent regulation and supervision of deposit taking institutions”
(Consultative Group to Assist the Poor 2006, 13).
CGAP and the World Bank see the best practices approach as the only
responsible way to organize a microfinance program. They seek an underlying
commitment by microfinance organizations to do no harm, that is, not to distort
markets or displace local commercial initiatives with cheap or free money (Consultative
Group to Assist the Poor 2006, 17). Most microfinance organizations could be, in one
way or another, accused of violating this commitment. After all, no such organization
expressly envisages a world littered with self-sustaining fully integrated banking
institutions; rather they seek to eliminate extreme poverty. Researchers have also noted
their concern that increasing commercialization of microfinance detracts from poverty
reduction (Mosley and Hulme 1996, Otero 1999, Consultative Group to Assist the
Poorest 2001, Drake and Rhyne 2002, Copestake 2006). However, to maintain access to
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the most lucrative funding sources7 they must balance the best practices perspective
with their own poverty eradicating (well-being inducing) missions.8
Not surprisingly, the well-being perspective in microfinance parallels the wellbeing approach to development. It is embodied in the mission statements of most
institutions. Quoting from the three largest microfinance institutions in Bangladesh,
Grameen Bank’s mission is to “enable the poor to create a world without poverty,”
BRAC “strives to bring about positive changes in the quality of life of the poor people of
Bangladesh,” and Proshika seeks to “move the poor out of poverty.” Their websites
abound with success stories in improved health, education, and livelihoods, while
information on self-generated funding, sustainability, and “inclusiveness” is left to
annual reports.9
Like the well-being approach to development, the well-being perspective to
microfinance success is less formalized than its counterpart. It emphasizes eradicating
poverty and creating development. A successful client in this perspective is
characterized by increased access to services, reduced vulnerability and poverty, and an
increased sense of well-being relative to his or her peers. There are even some
microfinance advocates who would characterize a successful program as one that

7

According to CGAP’s 2007 Annual Report, they advise 80 private funds with outstanding commitments
worth over 2 billion USD. It can also be assumed that they are instrumental in advising World Bank
microfinance lending projects (264 million USD) and many governmental projects (USAID: 216 million
USD) around the world.
8
A number of in-house reports and papers at BRAC attempt to bridge poverty alleviation with
“inclusiveness” (Chowdhury and Bhuiya 2004, Matin 2005).
9
The Association for Social Advancement’s (ASA) mission is an exception to the three quoted above. Their
philosophy emphasizes leadership, decentralized management, and financial responsibility in keeping
with the best practice philosophy. While it is considerably smaller than any of Bangladesh’s “big three” it
claims to be the fast growing microfinance organization in the world (www.asabd.org).
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empowers its participants, especially its female clients. Susan Johnson’s paper “Gender
and Microfinance: Guidelines for Good Practice,” directly confronts CGAP’s model and
advocates support programs to empower women and benefit program performance
(Johnson 1999). She believes that engendering microfinance through the services that
are offered, the community structures through which they are delivered, and the
support services that accompany them will lead to more efficient and effective
programs. Likewise, Linda Mayoux has consistently advocated for microfinance to
deliberately and consistently work for women’s empowerment (Mayoux 2006). She also
hypothesizes that gender equality and women's empowerment can significantly
contribute to financial sustainability.
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CHAPTER 3: NORTHWEST CASE STUDIES
Another influential work in forming the models and framework for this paper
was a case study I conducted with BRAC in 2007. BRAC offers a variety of microfinance
products to clients based primarily on their income levels and vulnerability to poverty.
The study was intended to assess, anecdotally, if differences in empowerment can be
correlated with program participation. The case studies illustrate the lives and
circumstances of microfinance clients and some of the complications that arise when
using commonly preferred empowerment indicators. Below are excerpts concerning
two such indicators, asset control and social capital.

Excerpts from Forming a Clearer Picture of Gender Empowerment through BRAC
Programs
Asset Control:
The first household interviewed in the Rangpur District was that of Saera and her
husband Babul Mia. They have two daughters and three sons. A year ago, Saera
dropped out of a BRAC microfinance program after participating for four years because
she was having trouble making payments. She has since joined Grameen Bank.
Saera was only able to list a few assets of value that belonged to the household.
This included 2.5 decimal of land10 and their home both of which are in the sole control
of Babul Mia. Saera and her sons jointly own a cow. The only sellable assets which
belonged exclusively to her were three goats.

10

One decimal equals ten Kath, and ten Kath are equivalent to one acre.
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This asset control arrangement fits with the literature which describes control
based on time-honored gender roles. Women are traditionally sovereign over only those
income generating things that can be managed and cared for in the home, such as small
livestock. It is suggested that only in the most desperate households, those suffering the
most extreme poverty and typically female-headed, will break these norms. Doing so
comes at the detriment of their perceived social standing.
A household in the Rangpur district that exemplified the importance of cultural
norms belonged to Monjla. Monjla, 42, has been a TUP11 member in the village of
Chatra Hat for five years. Her family consists of herself, her daughter-in-law, a
granddaughter, daughter, and son-in-law. Her son migrated to work in Dhaka several
years ago and left his wife and young daughter to reside in his mother’s household. He
has not been able to return home or provided much income support. Compounding
these hardships are Monjla’s marital circumstances. Many years ago her husband took a
second wife who owned some property. He has since died, but the second wife
continues to lease Monjla a home and some land.
Circumstances with her son and husband contributed to Monjla’s decision to
have her daughter married off at 14, well before the legal age. This provided the
household with a male head, who now, according to Monjla, controls all the household
assets. The family’s poverty forced Monjla to work as a domestic servant in town where
she receives three meals a day and 150TK (about $2.50) a month for her service. She

11

Targeting the Ultra Poor, BRAC’s microfinance product aimed at the poorest and most
vulnerable clients.
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did not want her daughter or daughter-in-law to have to work as well. She sold two
cows she had received as part of the TUP program to afford her daughter’s dowry.
Microfinance participation assisted Monjla in acquiring assets, which she
ultimately exchanged for a male head of household. She hopes that he will be able to
earn enough money to purchase their home and land. The value of a male provider in
the household outweighed the illegality of her daughter’s marriage and her daughter’s
continued education. It also bought the younger women of the household the ability to
more closely observe purdah, and there by improve their standing in the community.
We also interviewed Tulshi Rani. She is married with two children, both sons.
She is not involved in a microfinance program or any other NGO. For her interview we
questioned her based on an asset list and were able to fill in a Venn diagram based on
her responses. It showed that of the assets listed, only her ornaments and goat, which
she bought with money given to her by her mother, were completely under her control.
Jointly she owned the household savings and four pigeons with her husband. Aside from
that, the other household belongings, land, and livestock are controlled by her husband.
Comparing Tulshi’s household to Saera’s, the microfinance participant, Tulshi’s
household was visibly better off. However, had it not been for the asset transfer from
mother to daughter Tulshi would be without any assets of her own. Comparing these
two cases, it would appear that, controlling for their relative wealth, the microfinance
participant is more empowered than the non-participant. Another potentially critical
difference between the two households is that Saera is Muslim and Tulshi is Hindu.
From observation, though religious practices may be different, the social norms
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concerning gender roles and expectations are strikingly similar. The women in Hindu
and Muslim villages both prefer to work in and around the home while their male
relatives handle economic matters. In this context, female asset control has little value
as an indicator of empowerment since it exists mostly as a necessary byproduct of
undesirable circumstances. The ability to surrender control is a lifestyle that Monjla
aspires to for her children.
The final interviewee was an obvious exception to the usual microfinance
participant. Afroza Begum, a widow with two sons and a daughter, lived in a
comparatively affluent household. She was a BRAC member for 10 years, served as her
VO leader, was a legal aid educator and a union representative. She owned eight
decimals of homestead land and 70 cultivatable decimals. The assets she disclosed in
our initial interview were her bamboo bush, a few fruit trees, and two goats. She had
owned a cow which she sold recently to build a house for her son and provide capital for
him to invest in an ornament business. Privately, she confessed to having 40,000 TK
savings as well. A quick observation of her home revealed an abundance of marketable
assets. It also became clear from the interview and observing the way household
members responded to her that she was undoubtedly the head of household and either
directly or indirectly controlled the majority of assets and decisions.
This arrangement may have been out of necessity due to her being a widow, but
from our conversation it appeared that throughout her marriage she had maintained
joint control in decisions, such as the decision to join BRAC, and joint control regarding
assets, like what investments to make with her microfinance loans. She voiced her belief
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that with or without BRAC she would still be in a very good economic and social
position. It is clear Afroza is a woman who feels empowered to work for the
improvement of her household and her community. She is relatively more educated and
wealthier than many of her neighbors. She takes pride in using her abilities to work in
her community and enjoys the status that it affords her.
Comparing her perception of working in the public sphere and the perception of
the TUP member Saera, one could find evidence that wealth, education, and selfperceived status make a big difference in how a participant exercises empowerment to
improve their lives and what they perceive to be an improvement. Saera used her
resources to secure a male head of household and enable her daughters to observe
restrictive social norms. Afroza, on the other hand, did not feel that her social status was
jeopardized by participating in the public sphere in the ways afforded to her by BRAC.
The opportunity to work as a VO leader was a direct result of Afroza’s literacy. Saera
loses status by working as a domestic servant, and Afroza gains status through
community organization and leadership.
Microfinance clients at different places on the socio-economic scale have
different perceptions about what actions they need to take to advance themselves and
their families. The way Afroza, at the upper end, uses her resources and BRAC in a way
that is compatible with empowerment theory. She acquired and utilized economic
assets, educated all of her children, and sought leadership positions in her community.
At the other end of the spectrum, Monjla used the resources she acquired through
BRAC to invest in a husband for her daughter, which may very well be economically
28

beneficial for the household, but is not a story that indicates empowerment in the way
it is most commonly understood.
Since asset control is so mixed up in culture, education, relative wealth, and
perceived social status on its own, it is probably not the best single indicator of
empowerment. Where asset control for one household may symbolize stability and
prosperity, for another it may be closely associated with acute poverty and vulnerability.
For the majority of households somewhere in the middle it may be a largely irrelevant
concept. The relationship between asset control and program participation does not
appear to be linear, which makes it difficult to compare programs that target different
groups based on socio-economic indicators. As a sole indicator, asset control omits the
possible positive empowering impact that BRAC programs may have in other areas like
social and human capital accumulations.
Social Capital:
A critical but less frequently cited contributor to empowerment is social capital.
It is more difficult to quantify than physical asset control, which means it is not routinely
done. However, it is potentially more significant. Social capital is believed to be the glue
that binds microfinance recipients to their debt obligations. However, whether this
social capital increases the empowerment of microfinance participants is less frequently
explored.
We interviewed several participants and non-participants on a few aspects of
social capital including mutual support, exclusion, and collective action. We found some
intriguing variations among the women we interviewed.
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Saera, Monjla, Tulshi, and Afroza all acknowledged forms of mutual support that
exist in their communities. All of them could recall a time when money had been
collected to assist a family with a funeral or wedding. Afroza , a leader and a relatively
well off member of her community, claimed to often make donations for such causes.
Three months ago when a VO member’s daughter got married Afroza donated
cucumbers, electricity, and lights. She also helped raise money for the event and
approached the local mosque for additional assistance. When a VO member’s son died
in an accident, she again helped raise money as did the mosque. Tulshi also claims to
donate for weddings and funerals to poorer households.
The lowest levels of mutual assistance were expressed by Saera and Monjla.
Neither one expected much help in case of a community-wide or household-level
disasters. Monjla, whose home is in a flood prone area, said that they could stay for a
few days with households that are on higher ground while they waited for the floods to
retreat. They both believed that money could be raised from richer households, but
they both mentioned that giving or receiving assistance from other villagers would be
difficult because most are too poor to give and would likely find themselves in the same
situation.
Tulshi and Saera both expected the majority of assistance to come from the
government. Saera expressed very low expectations for assistance from the village
chairperson saying that to get help from him one would have to be a relative or close
friend. On the other hand, Saera mentioned the chairperson as one of the people she
would go to for assistance. Saera is experienced with microfinance programs and Tulshi
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is not. It is possible that contact with microfinance administrators and experience with
formal institutions has made Saera more likely to personally approach authority figures
for assistance. If so, this could represent a meaningful increase in social capital for NGO
participants.
Afroza expressed the highest degree of mutual support, but this is probably
closely related to her position which makes her a resource in the community. She is
often approached for assistance and would expect assistance if it were ever needed. It
should also be mentioned that her community is best described as suburban; only a few
kilometers from the center of Rangpur. This community is probably afforded a higher
degree of access to social infrastructure than more rural communities. Such
infrastructure includes mosques. They were frequently mentioned by Afroza as a source
of donations, but Monjla only mentioned mosques to say that the nearest one was too
far to be of much assistance. Monjla, it would appear, is isolated both physically and
socially from most support networks.
Inquiries about exclusion produced nearly homogenous results. Everyone said
that education and wealth are the most significant factors that divide the community.
The hypothetical question was posed: Suppose there was a rich and educated man, who
would he be most likely to associate with, a rich, illiterate man or a poor, educated man.
All four women interviewed identified the poor but educated man as the more likely
associate of the rich educated man, implying that education is perceived as more
cohesive factor than wealth. However, cohesion is not the opposite of exclusion. The
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women seemed to believe that wealth was a more divisive distinction and that political
differences are the most likely to lead to conflict in the community.
The discussions on collective action focused primarily on past political
participation. The level of political participation ranged from Afroza , a union
representative, to Tulshi, who had never voted. Saera, who expressed dissatisfaction
with her local chairman, votes but her participation does not go beyond this. Before she
was married, Monjla said she voted once because everyone else was doing it and she
wanted to see what it was like. Illiterate, she admitted that she did not fully understand
who or what she was voting for, but she was disappointed that the person she chose did
not win. For this reason she believes that voting is a waste of time. This belief did not
prevent her from participating in a campaign to have a chairman from her village
elected. She went door to door with a group to garner support for their candidate. He
lost the election as well, and Monjla has since given up political participation.
Despite the varying levels of participation, and interesting stories, there did not
seem to be a pattern or connection between NGO and political participation. It could be
theorized that experience with institutions and administration in addition to increased
information from participation in microfinance programs would increase the likelihood
of political activity. However, it appears to be more closely connected to attitudes about
effective governance and weighting the odds that time spent participating will
contribute to a desired outcome. For Afroza , political participation has been a source of
empowerment, but she associated its benefits most with increased status in her
community and not the opportunity to dictate outcomes for herself and her neighbors.
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For none of the women did political participation appear to be connected to ideas of
empowerment or gender differences.
Inquiring about social capital provided support for the theory that program
participation is connected with increasing social networks, particularly when it comes to
approaching authority figures and seeking support.
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CHAPTER 4: MODEL AND DATA
I am interested in determining what impact empowerment, or disempowerment,
has on desired program outcomes from the best practices and well-being perspectives.
Theoretically, mobility, domestic violence, legal knowledge, and household asset control
contribute to gender empowerment. I expect that restrictions on mobility and incidence
of domestic violence will negatively impact the desired outcomes from both
perspectives. I also anticipate that knowledge about legal rights will be positively
correlated with the desired output in both models. I expect to find, regardless the
perspective, that higher levels of client empowerment produce better outcomes.

Dependant Variables
Using data from BRAC’s North West Microfinance Expansion Project (NWMF)12,
this hypothesis is tested in models that reflect these differing perspectives. The wellbeing model uses microfinance members’ relative well-being within their community to
estimate the effect empowerment has on participants’ well-being—the desirable
development outcome from the well-being perspective. The same effects can be
measured from the best practices perspective by using a member’s tendency to default
as the dependant variable.
Enumerators asked respondents to compare their economic status to others on
a scale from one to four. Of the respondents questioned in 2007, almost 70%
considered themselves to be poor or very poor relative to others in their community.

12

The data surveyed 1,100 microfinance participants in 2003 and 2007, and a control group of
600 members with less than a year of participation in 2007. More information on the NWMF data is in the
following section.
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Figure 1: Well-being Compared to Others
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Self-assessed relative economic status is just one possible measure of a
member’s well-being. Some studies (Barun and Sulaiman, 2007) use total household
asset accumulation as a measure of well-being. This paper uses the self-assessed
economic well-being measure for two reasons. First, psychological dimensions of
empowerment are difficult to assess using standard survey methods, but selfassessments incorporate this important dimension to some degree (Alsop, Bertelsen
and Holland 2006). Second, relative well-being is less likely to be correlated with wealth
related independent variables.
The best practices approach to microfinance reflects the belief that in order for
programs to serve the long-run interests of the poor they must become linked to
mainstream financial institutions. This requires that MFIs adopt financial practices that
will lead to sustainability and self-reliance including adjusting interest rates upwards to
cover operational expenses, providing a range of specialized products, and holding
clients to high standards of accountability.
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The best practices counterpart to relative economic well-being is members’
tendency to default. These responses came from program organizers who were asked to
assess the default behavior of each participant. The available sample size falls from the
whole survey (1,610 individuals) to 733 individuals since the control cohort, women who
are not involved in BRAC programs, has to be excluded and some program organizers
were not available for survey.13
Figure 2: Tendency to Default
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Independent Variables
The two dependant variables, relative well-being and tendency to default, are
tested in a model to measure the effects of various aspects of empowerment on these
desirable development outcomes.

13

The program encourages members to take out loans even after an incidence of default to
improve the member’s credit and to refinance the defaulted loan. This helps keep overall defaults for the
microfinance program very low. The average participant in this survey had received three loans so far.
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Members were asked to identify the person from whom they seek permission to
leave the house (mobility). Only 12% of the members who responded to this question
did not require permission to leave the home. Of these women, 72% were either
unmarried or widowed.
Table 1: Who Gives Permission to Leave Home?

No permission required
Husband
Son
Father-in-law
Mother-in-law
Other

Total

Freq. Percent
156
12.51
1,038
83.24
12
0.96
23
1.84
16
1.28
2
0.16
1,247
100

Several different questions were asked to assess violence and coercive control of
members in their household (domvio) such as:
In the last year has your husband or a member of your household:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Taken money against your will
Taken a personal asset against your will
Prevented you from going to your parents’ home
Prevented you from working outside the house
Physically abused you
Threatened you with a divorce
Threatened you with the possibility of a second marriage

These responses were added into an index, where 0 indicated that all forms of
abuse occurred in the last year and 7 is the absence of any form of abuse. Of the women
questioned, 15% had experienced some sort of domestic violence in the last year. The
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most common form of violence was physical abuse and being prevented from working
outside the home.14
Figure 3: Incidence of Violence
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One support program available to BRAC members is legal aid. Legal disputes
involving land and taxes are common in rural Bangladesh as poverty and illiteracy make
the poor land owners particularly vulnerable to fraud. In an attempt to curb this
problem, BRAC
C members receive basic legal information. In addition to training on
property rights members receive information in the following areas:
•
•
•
•

Minimum age of marriage for girls
Rights in the event of divorce
Legal methods of divorce
Minimum voting age

14

I suspected a high amount of under reporting for this variable, an assumption that was born out after
examining the data. For more information on the data for this variable and my attempt at imputing the
missing data see appendix 2.
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As part of the survey members were quizzed in these areas of legal knowledge
(legal).
). 69% knew the right age of marriage for girls, 48% knew they were entitled to a
portion of assets in the event of divorce; 37% knew the legal method of divorce, and
51% knew the minimum legal age to vote. Their responses were compiled into an index
where 0 indicates low understanding of legal rights and 4 indicates a high level of
understanding.
Figure 4: Legal Knowledge

Number of Participan
Participants

The final empowerment correlated explanatory variable is asset control (asset
(
control).
). Members were asked to provide monetary values for all household possessions
and were asked who in the household could sell that possession. From this data, a ratio
was generated of assets the member had sole control over to total household assets.
The ratio’s ranged from 0 to 100, and the median ratio was .7.
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Figure 5: Asset Control Frequency
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respondents received no formal education and fewer than 20% at
attended
tended school for
more than six years.
Figure 6: Education
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Respondents were asked to report their household earnings and losses. The
difference in these figures is the total household income. Income in this sample ranged
from 3,000 to 246,000 BDT (44 to 3,617 USD) and the median income is 30,000 BDT (441
USD).
Figure 7: Household Income

Number of Participants

350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0

Annual Income in BDT

The duration of participation in BRAC programs is measured in years and the
median participation is just over one year. The age of participants ranges from 13 to 65
and the average age is 32 years.
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Figure 8: Years of Participation
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Number of Participants

Figure 9: Age
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The final independent variables consider the degree to which a member controls
her loan. This is represented in two dummy variables, one for loans controlled solely by
the member and one for loans solely controlled by another person. I expect that in cases
where the female clients have sole control over the use of the loan (floancont) wellbeing and best practices outcomes will be higher. Similarly, when other individuals,
typically a male relative, use the loan (mloancont) I expect that outcomes will suffer.
As is the case throughout Bangladesh, the minority of women in this study use
the loans they borrow. It is far more common for women to give the funds to a male
relative. In this sample, only 20% of all the loans taken out by members in this sample
were used by the member herself.
Table 2: Who Uses the Majority of the Loan?
Freq.

Percent

Member Controls Loan

212

20%

Other Controls Loan

648

61%

Joint Member and Other Control

200

19%
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The members who did have sole control used the loans in a multitude of ways,
but very few engaged them in a lucrative activity. Only 25% of women used the loans for
investment purposes compared to 42% of men. Women are more likely to apply loans
directly to consumption and medical treatment than their male counterparts. This might
indicate that poverty, not expanded opportunity, is the driving force behind female
utilization of loans.

Table 3: Use of Loan by Gender
Male Use of Loans

Female Use of Loans
Frequency Percent

Frequency

Percent

Investment

35

21.47

Investment

188

30.77

Purchase Asset

27

16.56

Farming

131

21.44

Medical Treatment

18

11.04

Purchase Asset

86

14.08

Farming

18

11.04

Purchase Cow

49

8.02

Consumption

15

9.2

Build Homes

40

6.55

Build Homes

12

7.36

Mortgage

31

5.07

Purchase Cow

10

6.13

Consumption

25

4.09

Wedding

8

4.91

Dowry

15

2.45

Mortgage

8

4.91

Wedding

13

2.13

Dowry

5

3.07

Medical Treatment

11

1.8

Transportation

1

0.61

Pay off Loan

10

1.64

Pay off Loan

1

0.61

Give Loan Away

6

0.98

Give Loan Away

1

0.61

Education Fees

2

0.33

Installment

1

0.61

Earn Interest on Loan

1

0.16

Purchas Land

1

0.61

Purchas Van

1

0.16

Litigation

1

0.61

Purchase machine

1

0.16

Bribing

1

0.61

Lease Land

1

0.16

The independent and dependent variables are described in table 5 and
summary statistics are presented in table 6.
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Table 4: Description of Independent and Dependent Variables
Variable

Variable Name

Description

Independent Variables
Best Practices

BP

Likelihood of default assessed by program manager.
0=at risk of default; 1=no risk.

Well-being

WB

Self-assessed participant well-being. 0= poor or very
poor; 1= middle or rich.

Mobility (M)
Mobility

mobility

0= permission required from husband/father/son;
1=no permission required

Components of Legal Knowledge Index (K)
0= does not know legal age of marriage for females;
1= does know

Legal Marriage Age

rmrw

Denmohor (alimony)

dnmr

0= no or does not know; 1= yes

Legal Divorce

divo

0= does not know legal method of divorce; 1= does
know

Legal Voting Age

vot

0= does not know minimum voting age; 0= does
know

Components of Violence Index (V)
Has household member taken money
against your will?

evna

0=yes, event has occurred in last year; 1= no or no
response

Has household member taken assets
against your will?

evnb

0=yes, event has occurred in last year; 1= no or no
response

Has household member restricted visits
to your parent's house?

evnc

0=yes, event has occurred in last year; 1= no or no
response

Has household member restricted your
ability to work outside the home?

evnd

0=yes, event has occurred in last year; 1= no or no
response

Has household member physically
abused you?

evne

0=yes, event has occurred in last year; 1= no or no
response

Has husband threatened you with a
divorce?

evnf

0=yes, event has occurred in last year; 1= no or no
response

Has husband threatened you with a
second marriage?

evng

0=yes, event has occurred in last year; 1= no or no
response

Asset Control (A)
Control of Household Assets

asset control

% of total household assets that are solely controlled
by member

Demographic (D)
Member's Education
Member's Age
Total Household Income

education
age
log income

years of education
age in years
log of total household income in 2006

Loan Control (C)
Female participant uses loan
Person other than member uses loan

floancont

1= member uses loan; 0= joint or other control

mloancont

1= another person uses the loan; 0= joint or member
control
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Table 5: Summary Statistics
Variable

Mean

Mobility
Membership Years
Legal Knowledge
Domestic Violence
Asset Control
Member Loan Control
Other Loan Control
Education
Age
Log Income
Income

0.12
3.55
2.07
6.76
20.25
0.20
0.61
2.52
33.64
10.31
36,695

Std.
Dev.
0.33
5.21
1.26
0.69
36.78
0.40
0.49
3.22
9.51
0.64
27,125

Min

Max

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
13.00
6.91
1,000

1
13.24
4
7
100.00
1
1
12.00
68.00
12.41
246,000

The basic model to be tested can be represented by:
Pi= f(Mi, Vi, Ki, Ai, Di, Ci),
where P is the dependant variable representing program orientation, M is mobility, V is
domestic violence, K is legal knowledge, A is asset control, D is the potentially significant
demographic and socioeconomic indicators, and C is control over the loan.
The models will be estimated as bivariate logits. In the bivariate logit, the
probability of an individual’s relative well-being or tendency to default is recoded to
meet the necessary logit assumptions. In the case of the well-being model, clients who
responded that they were “very poor” or “poor” are categorized together and those
who responded that they were “middle” income or “rich” are grouped together. For the
best practice model the clients are divided into two groups, those who do not have a
tendency to default and those who do.
Table 6: Bivariate Dependent Variables
Well-being
Freq.

Best Practices

Percent

Freq. Percent

Poor

736

69.43

Default

356

43.84

Well Off

324

30.57

Never Default

456

56.16
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Total

1,060

100

Total

812

100

The simple bivariate logit model can be expressed as:

Where y* is an unobserved value, and:

I expect all of the independent variables to be significant, but for some variables
there are reasons to believe that the impact could be positive or negative.
negative While many
of the variables may in theory be positively correlated with participant well-being
well
or a
successful microfinance program in the best practices model, underlying cultural
assumptions could have weighed heavily in the responses of those interviewed. For
example, purdah would limit a woman’s mobility but is also a luxury that the extreme
poorr are less able to afford. It is possible that as self
self-perceived well-being
being increases this
measure of empowerment decreases. The relationship could be similar for control of
assets and control of loans. As well-being and economic integration increases families
fami
may consider traditionally preferable household arrangements that exclude female
participation in wage earning activity and financial decisions. Finally, the domestic
violence index is composed of elements that could also respond in an unintended way
to microfinance, including being prevented from working outside the home or traveling
to one’s natal home. I predict that the desirable outcomes should be positively
correlated with increased mobility, asset control, control of loans, and decreasing levels
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of domestic violence. However, perceptions related to these variables are a potentially
significant unobserved variable.
Predicting the sign of the remaining variables is more straightforward. I expect
that in both models income, education, legal knowledge, and age will have a β>0.
Income should be positively associated with a client’s repayments and her self-assessed
relative well-being. Increasing knowledge through formal or legal education should have
a positive impact on a client’s management capabilities and decrease her chance of
default and increase her relative well-being. Finally, as a client ages her capabilities and
asset stock should increase which will also correlate positively with both dependent
variables.
Table 7: Predicted Values

Independent Variables
Mobility
Membership years
Legal Knowledge
Domestic Violence
Asset Control
Member Loan Control
Other Loan Control
Education
Age
Log Income

Dependent Variables
WB

BP

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

-

-

+

+

+

+

+

+
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Data
BRAC’s North West Microfinance Expansion (NWMF) project was taken up in
2002 to deliver services to the underserved communities in that region.15 To investigate
the project’s effectiveness, BRAC initiated a study in 2003 and a follow-up in 2007.
A two-stage sampling strategy was followed. All of the eight branch offices that
were created under the project were covered by the survey. From each branch, 12
village organizations were randomly selected. Finally, 11 to 12 member households
were selected from each village. Thus, 1,100 households were surveyed in the baseline.
The follow-up survey added 600 households whose enrollment was no more than one
year as of February 2007. From 2003 to 2007 the attrition rate was 8%.
About 42.9% of the population of Bangladesh lives below the poverty line,16 and
in the Northwest the figure rises to over 60% (Barun and Sulaiman May 2007, 7).17 The
region is plagued by seasonal flooding which leads many residents to avoid investments
in physical capital and in turn creates a disincentive for microfinance institutions to
operate in the region.18 The Northwest Microfinance Expansion project was funded by
the Australian Agency for International Development to contribute to the millennium

15

See appendix 1 for a map of Bangladesh and the districts of Ponchagar, Thakurgaon, Dinajpur,
Nilphamari, Lalmonirhat, Rangpur and Gaibandha.
16
According to the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics’ most recent “Key Findings of Poverty
Monitoring Survey.” The survey uses the FEI (Food Energy Intake) which is derived through regression of
the relationship between calorie intake and expenditure.
17
Poverty level is one dollar a day.
18
Severe flooding occurred in the summer of 2007 when thousands of people in the Rangpur
district, which is included in this data, were forced to flee their homes. Families often lose not only their
homes and belongings but also permanently lose possession of their land when it erodes into the rivers
(IRIN, the humanitarian news and analysis service of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs 2007).
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development goal of halving poverty by 2015. The project primarily funded loans and
established BRAC offices in the region.
Poverty in rural Bangladesh manifests itself in several ways. Rural life
expectancy is lower than urban life expectancy and rural areas have higher under-five
and maternal mortality rates. Rural women receive fewer years of schooling, marry
younger, and have more children than their urban counterparts. BRAC members
surveyed in the NWMF data are relatively worse off than the average Bangladeshi.
Table 8: Bangladesh Poverty Statistics
National
under 5 mortality per 1000

Urban

Rural

NW sample

74

60

77

maternal mortality

3.65

2.53

3.87

fertility rate

20.8

17.8

21.6

Life Expectancy (male and female)

65.1

67.8

64.3

female literacy rate

45.8

62.7

41.6

42.84

% of married females

62.19

60.23

62.7

47.73

food as % of income

53.8

47.42

clothing as a % of income

5.51

13.11

asset purchases as % of income

2.05

12.85

% with sanitary toilet

24.41

58.2

% with access to clean water

96.67

94.35
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CHAPTER 5: LOGIT ASSUMPTIONS
Logit models have to satisfy the assumptions of logistic regression, including: 1)
no misspecification, and 2) no severe multicollinearity. When the assumptions of logistic
regression are not met there may be problems such as a biased coefficient estimates or
large standard errors, both of which can lead to invalid inferences. Before discussing
the results from my models, I will show that these conditions have been met.

Assumption 1
There are two aspects to consider when evaluating for a specification error: the
dependent and the independent variables. In the ordered estimations the dependent
variables have to be ordered in nature, which has been met. Concerning the
independent variables, we assume that all the relevant variables have been included,
that extraneous variables have been excluded, and that the logit function is a linear
combination of independent variables.
If a model is properly specified there should not be any additional significant
predictors. Linktest uses predicted values after a regression and predicted values
squared to retest a model (StataCorp 2007). The linktest was significant in the wellbeing model (z=-3.36 and z=4.36) but not in the best practices model, indicating that
there is a specification error in the well-being model. However, experimenting with
variables that may be theoretically significant in both the models did not decrease the
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linktest’s significance. If an omitted variable is responsible for the error, then it may be
one that was unobserved in the NWMF data.

Assumption 2
Multicollinearity occurs when one independent variable is determined by
another independent variable. Many statistical programs automatically correct for
perfect multicollinearity by dropping one of the responsible variables, but lesser degrees
of collinearity may exist which, if severe enough, can lead to high standard errors and
potentially lead to large confidence intervals to the coefficients.
Reviewing the standard errors and coefficients produced in both models does
not give any strong indication that multicollinearity is present. To confirm the
observation that multicollinearity is not present, a correlation matrix or variance
inflation factor (VIF) can be estimated. The VIF is an indicator of how much the inflation
of the standard error can be caused by multicollinearity (UCLA, 2008). Table 10 provides
the variance inflation factors for the well-being and best practices models. The relatively
low VIF’s (all <2) for all variables confirms the assumption of no multicollinearity.
Table 9: Variance Inflation Factor

Variable
Education
Age
Log Income
Legal Knowledge
Asset Control
Membership Years
Domestic Violence
Member Loan Control
Other Loan Control
Mobility
Mean VIF

Well-being
VIF
1/VIF
1.29
.7749
1.24
.8065
1.14
.8738
1.11
.9007
1.14
.8775
1.04
.9602
1.02
.9767
1.81
.5527
1.72
.5823
1.03
.9732
1.25

Best Practices
VIF
1/VIF
1.31
.7625
1.22
.8183
1.15
.8690
1.14
.8746
1.15
.8711
1.03
.9698
1.02
.9820
1.82
.5503
1.74
.5759
1.04
.9592
1.26
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Table 11 displays the correlation matrix for all the independent variables,
several of which are significantly correlated at a 95% confidence interval, but none are
high enough to indicate severe collinearity.
Table 10: Correlation Matrix

Mobility
Member Years
Legal Knowledge
Domestic Violence
Asset Control
Education
Age
Income
Member Control
Other Control

Mobility
1
0.0122
-0.0486
0.0183
0.0102
-0.0359
0.0967
0.0910
0.0936
-0.0241

Member
Years

Legal
Knowledge

Domestic
Violence

1
-0.0347
-0.0311
0.1494
-0.0907
0.1018
-0.0242
0.0476
-0.0166

1
-0.0440
-0.0912
0.2578
-0.1555
0.0313
0.0795
-0.0777

1
0.0153
0.0300
0.0781
0.0479
-0.0568
-0.0143

Asset
Control

1
0.0800
-0.0052
-0.1577
0.1828
-0.0353

Education

1
-0.3380
0.1508
-0.0076
0.0242

Age

Income

Member
Control

Other
Control

1
0.1844
0.0454
-0.0062

1
0.0274
0.0084

1
-0.6356

1

Overall, with the exception of the first assumption in the well-being model, the
diagnostic testing suggests that the logit will be an efficient estimator for these models.
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CHAPTER 6: RESULTS
This section will present the results for the regressions and an interpretation of
the bivariate results. Both of the models show evidence supporting the hypothesis that
empowerment impacts participants’ performance in microfinance programs given either
objective, and that there were significant variables in all estimations.
In the well-being model, legal knowledge and the demographic factors age,
education, and income were positively correlated with well-being, as hypothesized.
Mobility, however, did not demonstrate the expected sign. Mobility was significant, but
negatively correlated with a member’s self-assessed relative well-being.
The best practices model did not fit the data as well as the well-being model. Of
the empowerment variables, asset control was significant and was once again negatively
correlated with incidence of delinquency. Age and education were both positively
correlated at a 90% confidence interval. Surprisingly income was not significant at a 90%
confidence interval.
Table 12 shows coefficients and z statistics in the wellbeing and best practices
models.
Table 11: Well-being and Best Practices Comparison

Variable

Wellbeing

Best
Practices

z-statistic
Mobility

-0.9539*

-0.2733

-2.46

-0.73

Membership Years

0.0245

0.0026

1.41

0.21

Legal Knowledge

0.3150*

0.1176

4.01

1.30

0.0150

0.0762

0.10

0.58

Domestic Violence
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Asset Control

-0.0015
-0.55

-2.87

Member Loan Control

-0.2245

-0.6813*

-0.70

-2.20

-0.1852

-0.2914

-0.89

-1.11

0.1700*

0.0545*

6.46

2.01

Age

0.0374*

0.0222*

2.52

2.19

Log Income

2.0527*

0.1864

7.36

1.32

-24.5950*

-2.8483

Other Loan Control

Education

Constant

-0.0103*

-7.97

-1.72

Pseudo R

2

0.2496

0.0486

Prob > Chi

2

0.0000

0.0002

Log likelihood

-416.1640

-446.6720

Comparing Marginal Effects between Models
The marginal effects for the best practice and well-being models are shown in
Table 13. These are the marginal effects taken at the mean.
Table 12: Marginal Effects for Bivariate Logistic Models
Well-Being
Variable
Mobility

dy/dx

Best Practices

z

dy/dx

z

-0.1438

-3.17

-0.0681

-0.72

Membership Years

0.0047

1.41

0.0006

0.21

Legal Knowledge

0.0599

4.05

0.0291

0.02

Domestic Violence

0.0028

0.1

0.0188

0.03

Member Loan Control

-0.0412

-0.74

-0.1687

0.08

Other Loan Control

-0.3571

-0.88

-0.0714

-1.12

Asset Control

-0.0003

-0.55

-0.0025

-2.87

Education

0.0323

6.4

0.0135

2.01

Age

0.0071

2.5

0.0055

2.21

Log Income

0.3905

8.87

0.0460

0.03
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Mobility has a negative marginal effect in both models, but is only a significant to
self-assessed well-being. If a woman does not have to seek permission to leave her
home, it decreases her probability of high self-assessed well-being by 14 percentage
points.
Increasing the legal knowledge index is also significantly correlated with an
increase in well-being outcome. Increasing the index by one, or learning one of the
measured components of legal knowledge, increases the probability of high well-being
by 6 percentage points.
Asset control is significant in the best practices model and like mobility it did not
behave consistently with theory. A ten percentage point increase in the female asset
control within the household decreases the probability of a favorable best practice
outcome by 2.5 percentage points.
Education was associated with significant and positive outcomes in both models.
Increasing education by one year increased the probability of a favorable best practices
outcome by 1 percentage point and increased the probability of a high well-being
outcome by 3 percentage points.
Age was significant and increased the probability of a favorable outcome in both
models. A one year increase in age increased the probability of favorable best practices
outcome by .55 percentage points, and increases the probability of high well-being by .7
percentage points.
Finally, increasing income has the greatest impact on self-assessed well-being.
Raising income by ten percent increased the probability of high well-being by 4 percent.
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Surprisingly, the same change was insignificant in the best practices model. For the
poor, a ten percent increase in income is quite small and so while it increases perceived
well being, it may not have any effect on the probability of default.
These results provide evidence that empowerment can play an important role in
the success of microfinance programs. When women are educated and well informed of
their rights they will have statistically significant increases in relative well-being and be
better clients to their microfinance programs. However, two of the variables did not
demonstrate the characteristics anticipated. In the case of mobility, theory would
indicate that less-constrained mobility will increase economic and social opportunities
and therefore improve well-being and reduce default, but the opposite seems to be the
case. The same is true for asset control, a common proxy for empowerment. Increasing
female control of household assets should improve her perceived well-being and give
her the opportunity to be a better microfinance client, but this is not the relationship
the variable had in this data.
I believe, as mentioned in previous sections, that these unexpected results are
attributable to traditional perceptions about the role of a prosperous woman. In both
models the independent variables, well-being and incidence of default, were based on
the opinion of the respondent and not objective measurements. A woman with
unconstrained mobility and high levels of control over assets in the household may see
these conditions as a necessary consequence of poverty or another undesirable factor,
and therefore may assess her well-being at a lower level. This situation was illustrated in
the case studies by Monjla. After her husband’s second marriage there was no one in
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her household to constrain her mobility and as the sole potential wage earner it became
necessary for her to travel and work outside the home to support herself and her
children. It would also follow that as the sole head of household Monjla would have a
high asset control ratio. The village organization manager may see a woman in this
situation as a high risk client and attribute them with a higher risk of default.
In these estimations, the only variable where the manager and the client
disagree on the meaning of an indicator is in who controls the loan. A woman who uses
a loan on her own may see her economic participation in a traditional undesirable way,
but the village manager perceives it differently. When the woman has control over the
application of her loan she is more likely to be a better steward of that loan and have
more means available to her to make payments than if she were acting like an
intermediary.
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION
The results of this analysis have shown that gender empowerment improves
desirable program outcomes in every perspective. It also provides evidence that
changing perceptions about empowerment could improve outcomes. From the best
practices perspective it is clear that women who have control over their loans make
better clients, but women may seek to forfeit this responsibility to maintain traditional
gender norms. Similarly, women do not perceive unrestrained mobility as a privilege or
a tool to increasing their well-being, and may actively seek to relinquish this power
when possible. By working to disassociate female economic participation with socially
undesirable circumstances, Bangladeshi microfinance organizations will be able to
achieve better outcomes.
Such programs currently exist, but are underfunded and not widely
implemented. BRAC’s Gender Quality Action Learning (GQAL) program aims to reduce
discrimination and violence against women—a necessary start to real empowerment.
Despite strong evidence that the programs effectively improve the capabilities of
women it has only been implemented in two districts for a few hundred of BRAC’s
estimated 110 million participants (Rao and Kelleher 1998). Continuing to study the
positive impact that empowerment has on program outcomes might provide the
evidence that organizations need to make meaningful investments in empowerment.
Understanding the role that traditional gender attitudes play in the way clients
participate in microfinance should be the focus of further study. It is likely that support
programs that educate the community on gender issues and work to change the
environment for female economic participation will yield large and sustainable long-run
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benefits. The question should also be revisited whether or not women are always the
most appropriate clients. In most cases female loan recipients act as intermediaries, but
the more closely the user of a loan is associated with the lender the more successful and
sustainable that lending institution is likely to be.
Finally, the concept of empowerment needs to be better understood if it is going
to be a useful tool in “pro-poor” development. The approach the World Bank is
currently promoting to study empowerment focuses on asset control (Alsop, Bertelsen
and Holland 2006; Stern, Dethier and Rogers 2005). However, it would appear that there
is a spurious correlation between asset control and empowerment. If World Bank
programs that target Bangladeshi women persist in using this indicator as a measure of
empowerment they may not be acting in the best interest of programs or their target
audience. Programs and development institutions should explore the use of more
dynamic indicators to inform their activities and produce better gender outcomes.
Bangladeshi microfinance programs provide individuals and households with
low-cost financial capital—an opportunity and a resource which was previously
unavailable to the poor. However, this one poverty alleviating tool is now commonly
seen as a panacea for other problems that plague Bangladeshi society. By questioning
the long held belief that microfinance benefits women merely by existing, programs and
donors can begin to find ways to make this assumed relationship a reality. Rather than
undermine microfinance organizations, reexamining the supposed benefits of
participation will lead to improved theory, better models, and more effective programs.
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APPENDICES
District Map of Bangladesh
Appendix 1: District Map of Bangladesh

From http://www.dclalmonirhat.gov.bd/images/bangladesh_map.jpg
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Imputing Domestic Violence Data
In the Northwest Expansion Project data most of the respondents did not answer
questions on domestic violence. Out of the 1,610 observations where the question
should have been asked, 571 of the individuals questioned failed to respond. What stuck
out about this missing data was not that these are 571 missing data points, they were
coded specifically as “no response” rather than “missing data,” another frequently used
option.
In the United States it is difficult to get accurate statistics on abuse, rape, and
domestic violence because of underreporting by victims. I suspect that the same holds
true for Bangladesh. Respondents may be reluctant to answer questions on the subject,
and enumerators may be equally reluctant to ask. For these reasons, I wanted to try to
impute this data for better results.
Using imputation with chained equations I was able to infer some of the missing
data points. Appendix table 1 shows the imputed data against the given data.
Appendix 2: Domestic Violence Index
Domestic Violence Index
W/O Imputation
Index

Total

Freq.

With Imputation

Percent

Freq.

Percent

0

1

0.11

1

0.1

2

5

0.56

5

0.52

3

2

0.22

3

0.31

4

8

0.9

8

0.83

5

26

2.91

37

3.84

6

94

10.53

103

10.7

7

757

84.77

806

83.7

893

963

67

It is evident from a cursory observation of the imputation that not enough of the
data points were able to be reliably predicted to improve the regressions. I decided to
use the data as it appears in the data set rather than use the imputed data, but I
strongly suspect that underreporting incidence of domestic violence impacted the
significance of domestic violence in the regression.
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